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ARGUMENT I 
THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED BY PROFESSIONAL 
THERAPY ON OR ABOUT NOVEMBER 29, 1993 IS IN THE NATURE OF 
A MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL PURSUANT TO RULE 59 OF THE UTAH 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. AS SUCH, IT TOLLED THE TIME 
WITHIN WHICH TO FILE AN APPEAL, AND THE NOTICE OF APPEAL 
IN THIS CASE WAS TIMELY FILED. THEREFORE, THIS COURT HAS 
JURISDICTION OF THIS APPEAL. 
The Defendants/Appellees Salt Lake City Knee & Sports 
Medicine, Lonnie E. Paulos, and Thomas D. Rosenberg, argue that 
this Court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal on the basis that 
the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed. (The 
Defendants/Appellees shall hereinafter be referred to as 
"Appellees", "Medicine", "Paulos" and/or "Rosenburg".) Since the 
Notice of Appeal was filed within thirty (30) days after entry of 
the lower Court's order denying the Plaintiff and Appellant's 
Motion for Reconsideration (which was also timely filed), the only 
issue is whether or not the Motion for Reconsideration was in the 
nature of a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. (Hereinafter the Plaintiff/Appellant 
will be referred to "Rehabilitation" or "Professional Therapy") 
There is no dispute that, if the motion is in fact one under Rule 
59, the Notice of Appeal was timely filed, and this Court does in 
fact have jurisdiction of this appeal. 
It is clear under the law that, ,f[t]he title of a motion is 
not dispositive as to whether a court can grant relief under the 
motion." (See Kunzler v. O'Dell, 855 P.2d 270, 273 (Utah App. 
1993). See also Watkiss & Campbell v. FOA & Son, 808 P.2d 1061 
(Utah 1991).) The specific issue of whether or not a motion for 
reconsideration tolls the time within which to file an appeal was 
addressed by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Watkiss & 
Campbell v. F.O.A. & Son, 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991). In this case, 
under facts very similar to those in this case, the Utah Supreme 
Court concluded: 
Nevertheless, had FOA appropriately entitled 
its motion as one for a new trial, the effect 
would have been to ask the court to reconsider 
the summary judgment, and it would have tolled 
the time period to file an appeal. Under the 
facts of this case, the incorrect title placed 
on the pleading was not a bar to defendant's 
case. 
Id. at 1064. 
In reaching this decision, this Utah Supreme Court relied on 
the fact that the lower court had treated the motion to reconsider 
as a motion for a new trial. Also appropriate in circumstances 
like these is an analysis of the motion based upon the types of 
arguments and assertions contained therein. If they are the same 
as would be contained in a motion for new trial, then substance is 
elevated over form. (See Darrinqton v. Wade, 812 P.2d 542, 547 
(Utah App. 1991) wherein this Court was faced with an analysis as 
to whether documents filed after entry of default judgment against 
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the defendant were in fact a motion to set aside the default 
judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b).) 
Applying these principles to the facts of this case, it is 
clear that the Motion for Reconsideration was in fact a motion for 
a new trial. Specifically, Professional Therapy raised three 
arguments in its motion which were in the nature of an argument 
that it was entitled to reconsideration or a new trial under Rule 
59(a)(7) based on the court having made errors in law. First, 
Professional Therapy argued that the contract provision at issue 
was rendered ambiguous because the court's ruling was based on an 
interpretation which neither Professional Therapy nor the 
Defendants had propounded in their respective memoranda supporting 
their motions for summary judgment. As such, Professional Therapy 
argued that it was entitled to a trial on the meaning and 
application of paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement and was 
entitled to submit parol evidence. Professional Therapy also 
respectfully argued that the court's interpretation of the contract 
was so narrow that it could not possibly have been the intent of 
the parties. (See Transcript Pg. 5 at lines 12 through 24). 
Finally, Professional Therapy argued that, at the very least, the 
contract was drafted by the Defendants and should be construed 
against them. 
As part of this argument relating to the ambiguity of the 
contract, Professional Therapy pointed out to the court the 
apparently inconsistent positions taken by it in the first and 
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second hearings on summary judgment. Professional Therapy believed 
that this was an irregularity in the proceedings and requested 
clarification of the basis on which the court made its ruling. 
Therefore, the motion may also be in the nature of one filed under 
Rule 59(a)(1) seeking relief from the judgment based on the 
irregularities of proceedings before the court. 
The other major argument made by Professional Therapy in its 
Motion for Reconsideration was that the court committed an error in 
law in limiting its analysis of the transaction between Defendants 
and IHC to the terms of the Asset Purchase Agreement. Since this 
document was only one of approximately twenty documents executed by 
defendants and IHC on May 24, 1990 and since these documents were 
clearly interrelated, the court was required by law to construe 
them together. 
In the Motion for Reconsideration on this issue, Professional 
Therapy cited its primary case in this regard, Verhoef v. Aston, 
740 P.2d 1342 (Utah App. 1987). As argued more specifically in 
Professional Therapy's primary brief, in Verhoef, this Court held 
that all documents executed substantially contemporaneously by a 
set of parties and which documents are clearly interrelated must be 
interpreted together as one transaction. As such, Professional 
Therapy argued before the lower court that it must reconsider its 
decision because, after the closing of the transaction between the 
Defendants and IHC, all of the Defendants' right, title and 
interest in the Center was effectively transferred to the joint 
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venture, Sports Medicine West, and Defendants retained nothing. 
Therefore, the provisions of paragraph 11 of the Termination 
Agreement had been satisfied, and Professional Therapy would be 
entitled to payment by Defendants of one-third of the purchase 
price attributable to goodwill. The lower court summarily 
dismissed this position as being "unpersuasive" without any attempt 
to give a basis for its decision to do so or the non-applicability 
of the Verhoef case. It is clear, however, that the substance of 
the motion was a request for a new trial under Rule 59. 
In arguing that the Motion for Reconsideration is not a motion 
for a new trial, the Defendants rely in part upon the purported 
treatment of the Motion by the trial court. However, simply 
because the trial court so summarily dealt with Professional 
Therapy's arguments at the hearing does not mean that the court did 
not consider the motion to be a motion for new trial. Instead, the 
court made it clear that it reviewed its decision prior to the 
hearing and did reconsider its ruling. The court stated it 
remained unpersuaded by what it called the "joint venture 
argument", and it was not persuaded that Professional Therapy was 
entitled to a trial. These are of course issues of law which are 
addressed in this appeal. However, they establish that the court 
did treat the motion as one made pursuant to Rule 59. 
Therefore, the substance of the arguments contained in the 
Motion for Reconsideration establishes that they are arguments 
which would support the granting of a new trial or reconsideration 
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of a summary judgment pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. The court granted the Motion and heard oral 
argument. The court made it clear that it did in fact consider 
Professional Therapy's arguments and reconsider its decision, and 
therefore the court treated the motion as one for a new trial. As 
a result, the Motion for Reconsideration timely filed by 
Professional Therapy was in fact a motion for a new trial under 
Rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the filing of 
the motion tolled the time period within which to file the notice 
of appeal. Because the Notice of Appeal was filed within thirty 
(30) days after entry of the Order Denying the Motion for 
Reconsideration, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction of this 
appeal. 
ARGUMENT II 
MISCELLANEOUS RESPONSES TO ARGUMENTS MADE BY APPELLEES. 
With respect to the arguments made by the Appellees in their 
brief, Professional Therapy would simply offer the following 
statements: 
1. At no time, either before the trial court or before this 
Court, have the Appellees in any way addressed the applicability of 
the case of Verhoef v. Aston 740 P.2d 1342 (Utah 1987) to the facts 
of this case. They make no effort to distinguish the case or to 
argue that it does not apply to the documents executed by and 
between the Appellees and IHC on May 24, 1990. Professional 
Therapy asserts that the Appellees can offer no such arguments as 
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it is clear the Verhoef case does apply to the transaction. As 
such, all of the documents must be construed together to determine 
whether or not there has been a sale as that term is defined in the 
Termination Agreement between the parties. Contrary to the 
Appellees1 argument in their brief, this interpretation is 
consistent with the definition of joint venture in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 48-1-3.1(1) (Supp. 1994). Although a joint venture consists of 
co-owners, it is deemed to be "an association" and a "single 
business enterprise". It is this association which constitutes a 
single entity. 
Also, contrary to the Appellees1 statement, Professional 
Therapy is not arguing that the word "all" means less than 100%. 
Instead, Professional Therapy is arguing that, under the Verhoef 
standard of interpretation, the lower court was required by law to 
construe all of the documents executed by the Appellees and IHC on 
May 24, 1990 as one transaction. Had the court done so, then in 
fact it had no choice but to conclude that the Appellees did in 
fact sell "all" as that term is defined in the Termination 
Agreement. As a result, summary judgment should have been entered 
in favor of Professional Therapy declaring that there had in fact 
been a sale within the meaning of that term in the Termination 
Agreement and that Professional Therapy was entitled to judgment 
against Appellees in an amount to be determined at time of trial 
for one-third of the purchase price attributable to the purchase of 
good will. 
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2. Professional Therapy finds it interesting that the 
Appellees have so easily adopted the court's interpretation of the 
subject language in the Termination Agreement since the court ruled 
in their favor. As set forth with more particularity in the 
Professional Therapy's primary brief, after the initial hearing, 
the parties believed that the court was in essence favoring the 
position taken by Professional Therapy. In their Supplemental 
Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
Appellees vehemently argued that Professional Therapy should not be 
allowed to adopt the court's interpretation of the contract because 
that interpretation differed so markedly from Professional 
Therapy's original argument as to the interpretation of the 
contract. For example, at page 2 of their Reply Memorandum, the 
Appellees state: 
The only new argument raised by Plaintiff in 
its Supplemental Memorandum is its claim that 
it should not be precluded against trying to 
adopt the initial view of the court expressed 
at the September 24, 1993 hearing. While the 
tardiness of Plaintiff's last minute effort to 
adopt this court's initial view that a sale of 
part of all is equivalent to a sale of all may 
not preclude consideration by this court, the 
fact that neither party to the agreement 
argued or attempted to promote this 
interpretation of the Termination Agreement 
itself demonstrates the inadvisability of 
construing the Termination Agreement in a 
manner that neither party contemplated and 
which is contrary to the plain meaning of the 
contract. (R. 340.) (Emphasis added.) 
Despite the Appellees anticipated strong protestations to the 
contrary, this is exactly what the Appellees are now doing, e.g., 
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adopting the court's second view of the interpretation of the 
contract which is currently on appeal. However, the lower court's 
decision is contrary to the interpretation originally argued by 
both of the parties. As such, and as the Appellees recognized when 
the court's interpretation was not going in their favor, they 
should not be allowed to "jump on the band wagon". 
3. Contrary to the Appellees' argument that Professional 
Therapy wants it both ways by arguing on the one hand that the 
contract was not ambiguous, and then arguing on the other hand that 
the court's interpretation rendered it ambiguous, Professional 
Therapy is merely submitting alternative bases for relief. Such 
alternatives are clearly appropriate under the law. 
4. In footnote 8 on page 18 of its primary brief, the 
Appellees state: 
It is important for this Court to note that 
Plaintiff produced no evidence that the trial 
court's final interpretation of paragraph 11 
was inconsistent with what Plaintiff 
understood paragraph 11 to mean. 
This statement ignores that parol evidence was not admissible 
under the court's ruling, as the court ruled that the contract was 
unambiguous. Instead, it is important to note that Professional 
Therapy requested the opportunity to submit such evidence, and the 
request was denied by the court. 
5. The Appellees correctly argue that under the law the 
court cannot make a better contract for the parties than they made 
for themselves. (See Rio Alqom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd. 618 P.2d 497, 
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505 (Utah 1980)-) Professional Therapy would argue this works both 
ways and that the court cannot in fact make a worse contract for 
the parties than they made for themselves. Since this is clearly 
the result of the trial court's granting of the Appellees1 Motion 
for Summary Judgment, it should be reversed and remanded. 
6. Finally, it is clear from the Appellees1 brief that 
disputed issues of material fact exist in this action which 
preclude the entry of summary judgment. At the very least, these 
issues include the issue of whether or not the Center continued to 
operate under the same name at the same location. Although the 
Appellees argue that there was no admissible evidence before the 
court contrary to their position in this regard, the court did not 
strike the affidavits of Doug Toole and Greg Gardner which 
contained evidence that the name of the Center was not changed 
until after Professional Therapy filed this lawsuit. Therefore, 
there was directly conflicting evidence on this issue, and summary 
judgment was inappropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, and primarily on the Appellees1 
failure to in any way argue against the applicability of the 
Verhoef case to the facts of this case, it is clear that 
Professional Therapy is entitled to an order from this Court 
reversing the trial court's order granting Appellees' Motion for 
Summary Judgment and dismissing Professional Therapy's Complaint. 
Professional Therapy believes that it is in fact entitled to entry 
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by this Court of judgment in its favor that, under the facts and 
circumstances of this case, there has in fact been a sale as that 
term is defined in the Termination Agreement. Under such an order, 
the case must be remanded for determination of an amount equal to 
one-third of the purchase price attributable to the purchase of 
good will. Absent such a ruling from this Court, the case must be 
remanded for trial on all issues. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 13th day of March, 1995. 
GREEN & LUHN, P.C. 
ttorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 13th day of March, 1^95, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be [ i/\ mailed, 
postage prepaid via U.S. Mail, [ ] hand delivered to: 
Mark 0. Morris, Esq. 
SNELL & WILMER 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM 
!65 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 59 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT- 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments judgment against one joint tort-feasor as re-
§ 979 et seq. lease of others, 40 A.L.R.3d 1181. 
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 574 to 584. Key Numbers. — Judgment «=» 891 to 899. 
A.L.R. — Voluntary payment into court of 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be 
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of 
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, 
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors 
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a 
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a 
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be 
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the ap-
plication, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, 
or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later 
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is 
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affida-
vit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be 
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service 
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affida-
vits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional 
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by 
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment 
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall 
specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Juror's competency as witness as to validity 
Rule 59, F.R.C.P. of verdict or indictment, Rules of Evidence, 
Cross-References. — Harmless error not Rule 606. 
ground for new trial, Rule 61. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Correction of insufficient or informal verdict. 
Abandonment of motion. Correction of record. 
Accident or surprise. Costs. 
Arbitration awards. Decision against law. 
Caption on motion for new trial. Discretion of trial court. 
